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Abstract 
In this article I highlight and compare the main causal theories of reference for proper names, 
and propose a new approach based on the analogy of the causal chain of reference with the block 
chain from blockchain technology and Paul Ricœur's narrative theory. After a brief Introduction in which 
the types of sentences from the concept of possible worlds are reviewed, and an overview of the 
theory in the Causal Theory of Reference, I present the causal theory of the reference proposed by Saul 
Kripke, then two hybrid causal theories developed by Gareth Evans and Michael Devitt. In the section 
Blockchain and the causal tree of reference I present my idea of developing a new causal theory of reference 
for proper names through a causal tree of reference. In the Conclusions I talk about the further 
development of the ways in which the terms of reference could refer to certain objects and individuals, 
the main criticisms of the causal theories, and suggestions for future development.  
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Introduction 
John Stuart Mill argued that names can be divided into two types: connotative and non-
connotative. Proper names are the only names of objects that are not connotative and do not have a 
strictly meaning. (Mill 1882) 
John Searle argues that each proper name is associated with a set of descriptions that determine 
the reference. Thus, the name denotes indirectly. (John R. Searle 1958) 
Saul Kripke criticizes Searle's Fregean vision, arguing that the names are directly correlated 
with their nominatum, and proper names are rigid designators ensuring the same individual in every 
possible world. Kripke extends this idea to natural types of things: human, dog, gold, water, which 
would not be descriptive, but directly denotative. (S. Kripke 1980) Later, Hilary Putnam came to the 
same conclusion. (Putnam 1973) 
Gareth Evans presents his own vision, distinguishing two types of descriptive theories: a 
theory of what a speaker denotes by a name, and a theory of what a name denotes itself. (Evans and 
Altham 1973) 
Later, Searle returns by defending himself against Kripke's critics, introducing the concepts of 
"intentional content" and "intentional state." 
In their definitions and arguments, philosophers have used the concept of possible worlds, 
with the real world as one of many possible worlds. Each proposition is either true or false, in every 
possible world. Thus, we have true propositions (those that are true in the real world), false (which 
are false in the real world), possible (those that are true in at least one possible world), impossible (or 
necessarily false propositions, those that are not true in any possible world), necessarily true (those 
that are true in all possible worlds) and contingents (those that are true in some possible worlds and 
false in others). Saul Kripke introduced for the first time a semantics of modal logic, in which a 
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possible statement is true in at least one possible world, and a necessary statement is true in all possible 
worlds. 
1. The causal theory of reference 
Descriptive theories have tried to eliminate certain logical contradictions if the names were 
considered definite descriptions. Kripke rejected the validity of these descriptive theories by arguing 
that no unique description of identity is needed, identifying descriptions can be used even if the 
reference has not been correctly identified, and a description (as opposed to a name) cannot function 
as a rigid indicator. 
Subsequently, descriptive theories extended this idea of the disguised definite descriptions to 
a set of descriptions or a weighted average of these descriptions. 
Causal theories of reference describe how terms acquire specific references (especially logical 
terms, proper names, and natural terms) based on evidence. In the case of names, a causal theory of 
reference assumes that 1) the referent of the name is fixed by an original designation (called by Saul 
Kripke "initial baptism"), after which the name becomes a rigid designator of that object; 2) the name 
is subsequently transmitted by communication through a causal chain. Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam 
proposed the extension of causal theory to natural terms. 
In general, causal theories of reference can be classified into causal-historical theories of 
reference (original version), represented in particular by Keith Donnellan (Donnellan 1972) and Saul 
Kripke, (S. A. Kripke 1979) with the idea of a causal-historical chain, (Cumming 2016) and the causal-
descriptive theories of reference, (Psillos 1999) developed by David Lewis, (Lewis 1984) on the idea 
that there must be a minimal descriptive system as intermediate to the causal relations between the 
speaker and the object. 
The main criticism of the causal theory was that the communication between the different 
users of the name is not enough explained. 
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Louis deRosset highlighted the main differences between descriptive and causal-historical 
theories: (deRosset 2011) 
 
Descriptive theories Causal-historical theories 
Personal information helps to determine 
the name reference 
It does not matter the information, only 
the historical position determines the name 
reference 
You can't be massively misinformed 
about the name referrer 
You can be massively misinformed about 
the name referrer 
You can't really be under-informed about 
the name referent - such situations are deference 
cases 
You can be under-informed about the 
name referrer 
If you are under-informed but still use a 
name for a specific individual, you need to think 
about your own words 
If you are under-informed but still use a 
name for a specific individual, you do not need 
to think about your own words 
2. Saul Kripke 
Since the 1960s, Kripke has been a central figure in several fields related to mathematical logic, 
language philosophy, mathematical philosophy, metaphysics, epistemology and set theory. He had 
influential and original contributions to logic, especially modal logic, and analytical philosophy, with a 
semantics of modal logic involving possible worlds, now called Kripke semantics. (Fodor 2004) He 
developed the argument that necessity is a "metaphysical" notion, which must be separated from the 
a priori epistemic notion, and that there are necessary truths that are a posteriori truths, such as "this 
water is H2O". 
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In Naming and Necessity, Kripke proposed a causal theory of reference, according to which a 
name refers to an object by virtue of a causal connection with the object, mediated by the communities 
of speakers. He also states that the proper names, unlike most descriptions, are rigid designations (the 
proper name refers to the object named in any possible world in which the object exists). (S. Kripke 
1980) The ideas from Naming and Necessity evolved over time, developing on the basis of previous 
formal research in model theory for modal logic, based on the Leibnizian principle of the 
indiscernibility of identicals. 
Kripke states that descriptions cannot be taken as definitions of names, nor their references, 
nor their meanings. Kripke thus introduces the term "rigid designator" for something that designates 
the same object in every possible world and claims that the proper names are rigid designators. The 
existence of a rigid designator does not imply that the object exists in any possible world. It just 
assumes that in those worlds where the designator exists, it is the same object. Kripke lists and begins 
to discuss the six theses of the descriptive theory of names, highlighting a condition (non-circularity) 
necessary to satisfy these theses: 
"For any successful theory, the account must not be circular. The properties which are used in the 
vote must not themselves involve the notion of reference in such a way that it is ultimately 
impossible to eliminate." (S. Kripke 1980, 259)  
He rejects the theory that states that the referent of a name must be identified through a 
process of selection in which descriptions are compared or evaluated. In order to avoid circularity, the 
identifying description, although it does not have to include a self-reference, may include a reference 
to someone else's reference (a reference may borrow from another reference its authentication). Thus, 
Kripke outlines a causal theory of reference: a name spreads like a chain through words between 
people. The chain starts when a child receives the name and the parents start talking about the child 
using that name. At the other end might be a person who has never met the person and certainly does 
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not know the path followed by the chain of names to reach him. In Kripke's opinion, there is a 
connection from the initial "baptism", but the details are unclear. 
Unlike Strawson who imposes the requirement that the speaker must know from whom he 
received the reference, (P. F. Strawson 1950) Kripke's theory does not impose any such requirement: 
what is relevant is not how the speaker thinks he received the reference, but the current chain of 
communication. The reference, for Kripke, depends not only on what we think about ourselves, but 
also on the community, on the history of how the name gets taken over by the speaker, and on other 
similar issues. For such a theory the results are somewhat different in the case of a famous man 
compared to an ordinary man. Basically, according to Kripke, there is an initial "baptism" in which 
the object can be named by ostension or the reference of the name can be fixed by a description. 
When a person communicates the name to others, the person receiving the name must have the 
intention, when using it, to assign the same reference. 
Kripke admits that there are some cases where descriptions actually determine in fact a 
reference, but they are not synonymous with the name. The referent of the names is usually 
determined by a series of causal links between the people who used the name, and when the referent 
of a name is determined by a property attributed to that called thing, the connection is contingent, 
rather than necessary or essential. 
Kripke highlights the situation in which the speaker has erroneous opinions about a person, 
in which case the reference is determined by the fact that the speaker is a member of a community of 
speakers using the name, which has been transmitted by tradition from one link to another. The role 
of uniquely identifiable properties, in many cases of designation, is only to set a reference, by some 
contingent clues. 
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This causal theory of reference can lead to several problems: there may be names that do not 
refer, the chain may be interrupted, a reference change may occur, and so on. In addition, Kripke did 
not sufficiently explain what constitutes a "link" in the chain. 
According to Kripke, the sense of a name is the object it refers to, and the referent of a name 
is determined by a causal link between a kind of "baptism" and subsequent statements. He thus 
recognizes the possibility of additional semantic properties for sentences containing names, thus being 
able to explain why two names that refer to the same person can give different values of truth in 
sentences about beliefs. Later, in the article "A Puzzle About Belief", Kripke seems to oppose this 
possibility. (S. A. Kripke 1979) His argument would be that two names that refer to the same object 
but have different semantic properties should explain why co-referential names behave differently in 
sentences about different beliefs. Kripke claims that this demonstrates that assigning additional 
semantic properties to names does not explain what is intended. 
Kripke sketches a causal picture of names with two components: reference fixing and 
reference borrowing. (Devitt and Sterelny 1999) Fixing the reference of a name is obtained by virtue 
of an "initial baptism". The reference is fixed to an object by a person present, by ostension or by 
description. Subsequently, the name propagates through the reference borrowing, through a "causal 
communication chain", spreading in the community. The chain shall be kept for at least as long as the 
persons hearing the name identify the reference to the same object as they have heard. 
Kripke provides examples in which his theory does not seem to fail, as in the case of reference 
changes from a person who existed to a fictional character. 
The causal chain of reference may include a person who has never met the referenced person 
and does not know what path the chain followed to reach it. In the example of the famous American 
physicist Richard Feynman, 
"A speaker who is on the far end of this chain, ... may be referring to Richard Feynman even though 
he can’t remember from whom he first heard of Feynman or from whom he ever heard of 
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Feynman. He knows that Feynman is a famous physicist. A certain passage of communication 
reaching ultimately to the man himself does reach the speaker. He then is referring to Feynman 
even though he can’t identify him uniquely. ... he doesn’t have to know these things, but, 
instead, a chain of communication going back to Feynman himself has been established, by 
virtue of his membership in a community which passed the name on from link to link, not by 
a ceremony that he makes in private in his study." (S. Kripke 1980, 91) 
Unfortunately, Kripke does not provide too many and clear details, such as what constitutes a 
"link" in the chain. In addition, Kripke's theory also generates problems, such as the existence of 
names that do not refer to real people, or the possibility that the chain may break, or that a reference 
change occurs along the way, as in the case of Madagascar analyzed by Gareth Evans. (Evans and 
Altham 1973) 
Searle, in his "Proper Names and Intentionality",  criticizes Kripke's theory: (John Rogers 
Searle 1982) the explanation of the name's introduction into baptism is, in fact, descriptive; the external 
causal chain does not reach the object, only at the baptism of the object, which may or may not have 
an external causal connection with the object; we can introduce a name by description and use it as a 
reference, even as a "rigid designator", and abstract entities with their own names are incapable of 
initiating physical causal chains; the causal chain is not "pure", it includes intellectual content 
associated with each use of a name. His conclusion is that the image of Kripke's chain of causation 
does not offer a sufficient condition, nor a necessary one. The mistake of such a causal theory would 
be that it goes beyond the analogy between reference and perception that is explicitly developed by 
Donnellan. (Donnellan 1974) 
3. Gareth Evans 
Gareth Evans, in The Causal Theory of Names, states that the causal theory of reference needs to 
be expanded to include what he calls multiple "bases". After the initial baptism, the use of the name 
in the presence of the person can, under the right circumstances, be considered as reinforcing the 
name in its referent. For those who are in direct contact with the person, the reference for the 
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expression of the name is solved by means of a causal chain that includes people who knew him during 
the "baptism", or by indexing the person to the name at the time of communication. The causal chain 
can continue through a series of referential uses of the name throughout the person's life. If confusion 
occurs, the referent switching of a name may occur. (Evans and Altham 1973) 
According to Evans, causal theory in its initial variant allows that no matter how distant or 
obscure the causal link between the use of a proper name and the object originally referred to, the 
reference is retained. The theory thus ignores the context by resorting to "magic tricks", and therefore 
cannot explain the changes of reference. 
Evans agrees with Kripke in rejecting the descriptive theory of reference, arguing that a subject 
may think of a particular object by virtue of the existence of a contextual relationship with it; but it 
challenges the cryptic image by accepting the idea that a name may change its reference over time and 
arguing that a mere causal link is not enough to refer. 
Subsequently, in The Varieties of Reference, assumes Frege's principle "no reference, no thought" 
(a sentence containing a name without a reference has no value of truth and does not express a 
thought); thus the semantic function of a name is to refer to an object, excluding the name with sense 
but non-referential. (Evans 1982) But, unlike Frege, he appeals to Frege's assimilation of the use of 
empty names with the fictional uses of language that express the pretended senses or pretended 
thoughts. (Borchert 2006) 
For Evans, the singular terms (including those that include demonstrative pronouns) conform 
to the principle "no reference, no thought", calling them "Russellians". 
Evans rejects the solid thesis (that the theoretical conditions of the description are sufficient) 
by accepting the weaker thesis that a descriptive identification is required for the name. He thus sees 
the theory of undifferentiated description as an expression of two ideas. 
"(a) the denotation of a name is determined by what speakers intend to refer to by using the name 
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"(b) the object a speaker intends to refer to by his use of a name is that which satisfies or fits the 
majority of descriptions which make up the cluster of information which the speaker has 
associated with the name." (Evans and Altham 1973) 
With (a) there are problems when interpreted at the micro level, but in names, as for other 
expressions in the language, "what they signify depends upon what we use them to signify". (b) is the 
real problem: the intended referent of a common use of a name by a speaker cannot be an element 
causal isolated to the user's community and culture; but " the important causal relation lies between 
that item’s states and doings and the speaker’s body of information—not between the item’s being 
dubbed with a name and the speaker’s contemporary use of it." (Evans and Altham 1973) Denoting a 
name in the community will depend in a complex way of what those who use this term intend to refer 
to (the "intended referent"). 
Evans tries to eliminate the problem of ambiguity by using an indefinite notion of speaker 
reference through borrowing from communication theory. We gain our knowledge and form our 
beliefs in the process of collecting information through a causal interaction with a particular object 
that is part of a long causal chain. Legends and imagination can add new elements. Incorrect 
identification can differentiate the considered source of information from the real one. It turns out 
that a set of information may contain elements from different sources, being able to reach a dominant 
element belonging to a source different from the original one. A speaker usually refers to the dominant 
element in the associated set of information. 
In this context, Evans offers the following definition proposal: 
"“NN” is a name of x if there is a community C— 
"1. in which it is common knowledge that members of C have in their repertoire the procedure of 
using “NN” to refer to x (with the intention of referring to x); 
2. the success in reference in any particular case being intended to rely on common knowledge between 
speaker and hearer that “NN” has been used to refer to x by members of C and not upon 
common knowledge of the satisfaction by x of some predicate embedded in “NN”" 
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Thus, Evans distinguishes between using on the basis of what we know and using on other 
bases, thus distinguishing between the referential functioning of names, which can be grammatical 
descriptions, from those of descriptions. (Evans and Altham 1973) The intentions alone are not 
sufficient for a name to obtain a denotation, but without clear intentions there may be no common 
knowledge required for practice. 
Evans's conditions are stricter than Kripke's, eliminating his "magic." 
In order to allow the name to be able to change its denotation, Evans proposes a supplement 
to the above definition with a new, deferential term (regarding individuals or groups of people who 
extend the use of expressions in a community). 
Evans offers various arguments to show that Kripke's theory does not fit our practice of using 
names: contextual determination of who it is important except for causal theory, (Bhowmick 2015, 
194) one can use the name without be necessarily causal connected with other users of the name, there 
is the possibility of a unified approach for all the ways of eliminating the ambiguity of the discourse, 
the change of reference is not taken into account by the causal theory of the reference. 
In conclusion Evans does not claim that causal theory is wrong; he is just trying to adapt it to 
the use of people's names under ordinary circumstances. 
Gareth Evans states that there may be wide variations between understanding "producers" 
(people associating names with person recognition) and "consumers" (who, according to Evans, are 
not able to inject new information into practice, but must use the collection of information from 
producers. (Evans 1982)) of proper name statements. According to Sikander Iamil, "acceptors" are 
true players in using proper names, using the name of a specific referent based on information received 
from other speakers. But there is a possibility of distortion of the received information, since the 
proper names strengthened, after their appointment, only by their use by the acceptors: "The meaning 
of proper name is provided by its immediate correspondence with a particular object. That’s why a 
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proper name and referent should go together; thinking one will lead the other. We may also assert that 
any speaker may use a certain name even without having an understanding of it, which means simply 
the understanding of the corresponding object i.e. its referent. But one may claim that any 
misinformation may contaminate thinking of ' the speaker regarding the referent of name.” (Jamil 
2011) Evans argues that "Full understanding of a use of a name requires that the referent of the name 
be an object of the subject’s thought." (Evans 1982) Thus, the proper name depends on the users' 
faith, thoughts and intentions. 
Only one producer presents sound arguments because of his initial knowledge of the name. 
The consumer knows the referent only according to the information provided by the producer. 
The more often a name is used by speakers, the more it strengthens in the minds of the 
speakers, making it more and more authentic. If a name with different referents in two distinct 
communication networks, additional information is required for correct identification when the 
information passes from one network to the other. 
A special problem arises in the case of a community that functions as a closed but permeable 
information system. In such a closed system a name can be distorted (intentionally or not), resulting 
in several proper names for the same referent that can operate in parallel, sometimes overlapping in 
the communication between different networks. This distortion can take the form of spreading fake 
news, or it can be intentionally used in the processes of slandering a person or a group of people, or 
even within state propaganda. In such a case, the framework for stipulating the reference by name 
proposed by Kripke through the initial baptism no longer applies. This distortion will not occur when 
the recursive principle proposed by Saul Kripke is applied, (S. Kripke 1980) whereby the one who 
established the reference to the initial baptism stipulates practices in the use of their own names, and 
the consumers will use the name in this respect, calling for a specific use identical to the one proposed 
by the one who named it. 
Nicolae Sfetcu: Causal theories of reference for proper names 
14 
Reference change is not possible according to descriptive theories. Initial causal theories do 
not pose the problem of reference change. Gareth Evans considers the significance of the change of 
reference, possible even from the initial baptism, although changing the reference to one's own name 
is much more difficult than in the case of natural terms, setting the Madagascar case as an example. 
(Evans and Altham 1973) 
Evans argued that the bearer of a proper name, used by a community of speakers, is the main 
source of causality of the information that members of the community associate with the name. 
Imogen Dickie sees Evans' suggestion as a major breakthrough, but it raises some issues. (Dickie 2011) 
Dickie takes "proper name" as a standard or default semantic type natural term, for which no 
additional settings are required. This assertion allows proper names to be used in other ways (e.g., to 
communicate about objects other than their bearers) depending on the scenarios. 
Dickie concludes that Evans is right that proper name has an essentially asymmetrical 
structure, assigning a privileged role to a core group of speakers. But Evans is wrong in stating that 
producers are important in establishing a name-based practice, suggesting that the role of producers 
is to ensure dominance, but that does not imply the exact transmission of information. The consumers 
are the active participants. 
According to Evans, the mental state of the speaker matters in determining the reference. For 
him, the causal origin of a name is not important in the reference; an object derives a name by virtue 
of the fact that it is the main source of causality of the information associated with a name. (Bhowmick 
2015, 195) But, by eliminating the need for initial baptism, Evans's theory raises two objections: the 
qua problem and the problem of incorrect causal source. 
The qua problem is considering the example of the cat "Trump" who was actually a flowerpot. 
From an intuitive point of view, it seems that the use of this name does not refer to anything, it is an 
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empty name. It follows that successful referencing requires that the individual initiating the use of a 
name has at least a correct notion of the object it refers to. 
The problem of the incorrect causal source arises when the referent is no longer related to a 
name by individuals who were in the presence of the object. 
4. Michael Devitt 
Michael Devitt develops a hybrid causal theory of non-empty proper names and certain 
singular terms that semantically resemble them. He considers that the use of a name designates an 
object not by virtue of the different information we know about it, but by a causal network that starts 
from the first uses of the name to designate the object, through a "reference borrowing" from the 
previous uses. (Devitt 1981) 
After the initial "naming ceremony", to use this name, a speaker must already have the ability 
to use names ("a mental state which is brought about in a language user by perception of a naming 
ceremony (and in other ways to be described) and which is apt to produce (in part) certain sorts of 
utterances—utterances using the name in question”). The first uses are causally related to the object, 
and then transmitted through a causal chain called by Devitt the "d-chain", d from "designation." The 
ability allows the use of the name in an ordinary predication. But, unlike descriptive theories, it is not 
necessary for a person to have a substantial set of beliefs that involve the name. 
The causal chains that are linked together form the causal network for a type of name. There 
can be multiple d-chains on which a person's use of a name is based, and a causal network based on its 
symbol formed from the union of all these individual networks. Devitt introduces the term "name 
token" which designates the object on which the underlying d-chain it is founded. 
Each time we hear a name being used, we must associate it with an ability. 
The correct understanding of the use of an ambiguous name is based mainly on the (external) 
context for the clues, usually represented by a reliable guide in terms of the speaker. The designatum 
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from the context depend a lot on what we already believe, especially about the speaker (what we think 
the speaker can designate by this name, and what we think he thinks we can designate through him 
and what he thinks we know about his designation abilities). Another important clue for interpreting 
a name token is the predicate used with it. In the case of an ambiguous context, we can ask the speaker 
to tell us his intentions. 
The d-chain starts with the perception of the object. The clear cases are those of "face-to-face 
perception" of the object. The connection between a name token and its object can be mediated by a 
description. If this connection is to be a d-chain, it is descriptive. 
According to Devitt, cross-reference is an example of how a token may depend for its reference 
on another. In his theory of reference borrowing, an analog type of dependency is the set of most single-
term tokens. Also, if an object is selected by an attributive description to its name, then the resulting 
name will be assigned and the object is not involved in the causal network for this term at the 
beginning of the network but may be involved later. Otherwise the network becomes grounded in the 
object and an attributive name becomes designative. The grounding allows a causal theory to explain 
the change of reference and certain errors and misunderstandings. 
A name can be indirectly grounded on its object, on certain types of representations of the 
object. 
Devitt states that a name token designates an object if and only if "underlying the name is a d-
chain grounded in the object". The d-chains consist of three different types of links: "groundings 
which link the chain to an object, abilities to designate, and communication situations in which abilities 
are passed on or reinforced (reference borrowings)". (Devitt 1981, 66) A person may lose the ability 
to designate an object when they cease to have thoughts that include tokens grounded in the object. 
An association between description and name consists in preserving the beliefs that the user would 
express using names and descriptions. But not all thoughts are beliefs. 
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A problem that may arise is when the causal chains for the term can be grounded in several 
objects or are not grounded in any object. Or, more abilities, and therefore more networks, can play 
a role in producing a designation term. Also, misunderstandings can lead to the involvement of several 
objects in a causal network. 
Groundings plays an essential role in Devitt's theory, representing the final link between all 
(designational) names and the world. 
In the case of a designation change, there are two possibilities: the old name continues to 
coexist with the new one, or not. This possibility allows a plausible explanation for the gradual 
transition from one naming convention to another. For a designation change to take place, a network 
initially grounded in one object must become grounded in another. The object must be of the same 
more general category. 
In the case of several networks, the similarity between them is a matter of degree, resulting in 
different notions of synonymy that can be defined in terms of similarity. Two networks become more 
similar if they are grounded in the same object. 
Although most names are conceptual, some are attributive, respectively a network is grounded 
in an object through a description. 
d-Chains are based on some notions that remain largely unexplained; the notion of perceiving 
an object is not sufficiently clear; as in the case of notions of thought, and of the notion of cause. 
The basic idea of the Devitt's causal theory of grounding is that the name is introduced into a formal 
or informal dubbing, in the presence of the object. (Devitt and Sterelny 1999) Perception must be 
causal. A witness to the dubbing will have the semantic ability to use the name to designate the object 
by virtue of the causal link; the perception of the object determined the thoughts that led to the use 
of the name. 
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The causal theory of the reference borrowing implies that people who are not at the dubbing acquire 
the semantic ability from those at the dubbing, which is also a perceptual causal process. The name is 
used in communication. Hearers can gain the ability to use the name to designate the object by virtue 
of causal chains that link the object, naming, and user through discussion. 
A name has both reference and meaning. The meaning of a name is a particular property of 
the name, designating its bearer through a certain type of causal link between name and bearer. The 
aspects of reality that we must call to explain the reference are sufficient for meaning. The reference 
of a name is determined by the appropriate causal chains, and thus by its meaning. 
The theory developed by Devitt shares with the descriptive theories the ability to account for 
certain special features of natural language: independent stimulus (the causal chain on which its use 
depends does not require the presence of the object); arbitrary and independent of the environment 
(any symbol from any environment can be placed in the appropriate causal relation with the object); 
and so it must be learned. Unlike descriptive theories, this theory can also explain the apparent 
abstractness of one's names. Also, according to Devitt, it avoids the problems of descriptive theory, 
can solve the problem of identity statements, promises an explanation of the final links between 
language and the world, and the explanation regarding causality seems to be naturalistic. 
Devitt concludes that causal theory about names cannot be a "purely causal" theory; it must 
be a "descriptive-causal" theory, so that a name is associated with a description in a grounding, thus 
appearing a descriptive element in the characterization of a d-chain. (Devitt and Sterelny 1999, 80)  
In setting the reference, a name is ostensibly introduced at a binding event in the presence of 
an object that will henceforth become the referent. 
The ability to refer is a mental state that contains a set of thoughts (beliefs, desires or hopes) 
that are grounded in the referent and associated with the name. 
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In the reference borrowing, those individuals present at the initial appointment spread to 
others the ability to refer through communication. 
To refine the notion of fixing references, Devitt uses several groundings, basing a name on an 
object just like the initial naming. 
Devitt's theory successfully deals with the qua problem, stipulating that the one who grounds 
names must perceive both the object and the thought of the object under a general correct term. Some 
degree of matching is required for a name initiator to obtain a name in an object. (Yang 2017) 
In the question of the incorrect causal source, Devitt's theory also provides an intuitive answer. 
Both Devitt and Evans believe that Kripke went too far in denying the descriptive elements. 
Thoughts associated with the name have a reference role. But I agree with Kripke that the name refers 
by virtue of a causal relationship. 
But although Evans believes that the initial baptisms play no role in the reference, generating 
the qua problem and the incorrect causal source problem, Devitt accepted the idea that appointment 
is essential, but that there is nothing necessary about the initial appointment. Through multiple 
groundings, he avoids the problem of changing the reference due to the error, without having to 
eliminate fixing the reference as an essential component of the name theory. Also, Devitt manages to 
avoid the problem of the source of incorrect causation because the names can only refer if they are 
causally related to the object through direct perception, and the problem stipulating that those who 
ground must have the correct belief of the object under a generic term. 
5. Blockchain and the causal tree of reference 
In a previous article, Philosophy of Blockchain Technology - Ontologies, (Sfetcu 2019) I talked about 
applying Paul Ricœur's narrative theory in developing an ontology of blockchain technology. In this 
section I intend to highlight the idea of an analogy between blockchain technology and the causal 
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theories of reference. To the extent that further deepening of this idea will prove viable, I will try to 
develop a theory based on this analogy. 
Blockchain (The Economist 2015) (Morris 2016) (Popper 2017) is a constantly growing block 
chain (Brito and Castillo 2016) (Trottier [2013] 2018) that contains records called blocks, which 
communicate with each other through messages. (The Economist 2015) We can consider a block as a 
certain sentence. The sentence is taken into consideration only if it includes the reference, as in a 
blockchain a block must contain the transaction data. Each block/sentence contains a timestamp and 
transaction data. The transaction data can be considered here as analogous to the reference, which links a 
name to an object. Just as in a blockchain a transaction is initiated by a miner and the causal chain starts 
from him, in a causal theory there is an initiator who gives the name and establishes the reference 
between name and object in a process (initial baptism). 
Blockchain is designed as "an open, distributed ledger that can record transactions between 
two parties efficiently and in a verifiable and permanent way," (Iansiti and Lakhani 2017) using a peer-
to-peer network. The transaction is the initial naming (baptism, according to Kripke), (S. Kripke 1980) 
and the peer-to-peer network represents the bilateral communication system between two nodes in the 
blockchain respectively two users of a community. After recording the data (accepting the reference), the 
data/reference in a given block/sentence cannot be modified retroactively without changing all the 
data/reference in all the blocks/sentences included in that chain, which requires the consent of the 
network (of the chain nodes; of users in the case of causal theory). Unlike the blockchain, where the 
block communication is made only between two nodes, and thus a chronological chain is formed, in 
the case of a community reference communication can be done from one user to several users 
simultaneously, which can then forward the reference, so here we can actually talk about a tree system, 
a causal reference tree. In the blockchain, at the same time as the data transmission, other additional 
information can be transmitted, but the acceptance is done only for the transaction data, the additional 
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information gives details about the transactions but does not count on the acceptance. In this potential 
causal theory, additional information (descriptions) can be transmitted simultaneously with the 
reference, but they are not taken into account when accepting the reference by the other users. From 
this point of view, such a theory of a causal reference tree rather accepts the idea of Saul Kripke, (S. 
Kripke 1980) that in a causal theory the descriptions do not matter. If the descriptions are intended 
to be included in the causal reference tree and some of these descriptions are modified, disappear or 
added over time, a temporary marking system can be imagined recording the changes. An idea would 
be, according to Tom Gruber in the paper On the design principles of the ontologies used for knowledge exchange, 
(Gruber 2008) the descriptions can be assimilated to the ontology as a technical term in the field of 
computer science: an ontology is a description (as a formal specification of a program) of the concepts 
and relationships that may exist formally for an agent or a community of agents. This definition is 
compatible with the use of ontology as a set of conceptual definitions, but more generally. And it is a 
different meaning of the word than its use in philosophy. 
Such a causal theory thus becomes, like blockchain, a secure, distributed system with a high 
tolerance for errors. (Raval 2016) 
Each acceptor of a reference thus memorizes the connection between the name and the object, 
and optionally the other additional information (descriptions, attributes). The causal tree is propagated 
only by the users who have accepted the reference (acceptors), and they in turn can forward the 
reference to other members of the community in subsequent discussions, which can become acceptors 
when they accept the reference. 
Each node/member of a community can initiate a new transaction/can name an object 
through an initial baptism, which is the starting point of a new chain/tree insofar as it is accepted by 
other nodes/members. 
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Communities that include the causal tree of reference may be open (may include new members 
accepting the established reference), closed (the reference is transmitted only between current 
members of the community - in the case of esoteric groups, for example, or of references considered 
secret), or permeable, where the reference is transmitted outside the community only under special 
conditions. 
If one of the nodes/members has, for the accepted name, another reference, or modifies 
(intentionally or not) the accepted reference for that name, a new branch is formed for the new 
reference, but not in the same plane as the accepted reference. with the consent of the other users. 
This is the case of a change of reference in causal theories. This leads to a three-dimensional causal tree 
of reference, and the new branch is the initial baptism for the new reference. If this new reference is 
accepted by other members, it is transmitted causally through the newly formed two-dimensional tree, 
parallel to the already existing dimensional tree from which it came off. 
For several two-dimensional trees that are part of a three-dimensional tree, the most-
developed two-dimensional tree becomes the main two-dimensional tree of the three-dimensional tree 
(the case of a name referring to a famous person). The other two-dimensional component trees 
become secondary trees. 
Such a theory can be interpreted as a result of syntactic notation in a reference field, based on 
the narrative theory developed by Paul Ricœur in Time and Narrative. (Ricoeur 1988) For Paul Ricœur, 
there is an order and a structure of history transmitted through the narration of history, otherwise 
history would be unintelligible. But the events and facts of this narrated history disrupt the dominant 
order and rearrange it. Ricœur examined a number of different forms of extended discourse, starting 
with metaphorical discourse. Narrative discourse is one of the forms investigated by Ricœur, (Pellauer 
and Dauenhauer 2002) configuring heterogeneous concepts that identify actions at a time when one 
thing happens not only after something else, but also because of something else from a story or history 
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that can be followed. It reshapes physical events as narrative events, which make sense because they 
tell what is happening in a story or history. Narrations are always a synthesis of the heterogeneous 
concepts that shape the episodes of the story. 
In Time and Narrative, Ricœur stressed the importance of the idea of a narrative identity. 
(Ricoeur 1988) Ricœur's argument regarding individualization continues through a succession of 
stages. He starts from the philosophy of language and from the problem of identifying the reference 
to people as individuals themselves, not just things. This leads to the consideration of the speaking 
subject as an agent, passing through the semantics of the action Ricœur had learned from analytical 
philosophy. 
Conclusions 
Kripke was aware that there may be several different uses for a name, which are used in 
different contexts (with different references). In the initial baptism, a name may be accompanied by a 
description. But Kripke considers that description to set only a reference and is not synonymous with the 
name with which it is associated. For this reason, Searle criticizes the causal theory. 
According to Sikander Iamil, the contexts in which statements are made are also important in 
identifying and determining references. Donald Davidson attempts to branch out the theory of 
meaning into two methods, the building block method (the simplest propositions form the complex 
ones) and the holistic method (starting with complex sentences and then analyzing its components). 
The first method is not a pragmatic approach, while the second method can be used only to 
understand the components, but the semantic value of the sentence can be distorted. (Jamil 2011) For 
the theory of meaning by means of Davidson's block method, causal theory has no pragmatic value. 
Eliot Michaelson and Marga Reimer consider four distinct ways in which terms of reference 
could refer to certain objects and individuals in the world. (Michaelson and Reimer 2019) 
1. Descriptive model: words are associated with descriptive content to identify a specific referent; 
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2. Causal model: the words are associated with the causal chains starting from an initial "baptism" 
of the referent; 
3. Character model: words are associated with common rules of reference, which involve the 
repeatable elements of the context, identifying the referent from these elements; 
4. Intentionalist model: words are used intentionally to refer to certain objects, as part of complex 
intentional actions that are aimed at certain referents. 
Of these, three reference models are basic in the metasemantics of referential terms: the 
descriptive model, the causal chain model and the character model. The last two, through 
hybridization, can help clarify important aspects of indexical name theory. Kaplan proposes that the 
context, in addition to the speaker, place, time, etc., should include the most important individual 
bearing a given name. (Kaplan 2006) But it always seems difficult to use the name to refer to the most 
important individual of that name in a context. In addition, accepting this type of indexical theory 
involves renouncing some of the benefits of causal theory, including simplicity, and the fact that we 
no longer send names for things, just the reference to the most important bearer of that name in a 
certain context. 
Causal theory can be considered a special case of character theory, in which terms such as 
names and rules are explained within a causal chain. 
Causal theory offers ways of thinking about an object by transmitting a name. The 
communication here is simple, provided the name is recognized on a certain occasion. But causal 
theory is a non-expansionist model of reference, usually being used only for reference to names. It 
will have to allow the existence of other types of relationships in order to extend the reference for 
other types of terms and different uses of the same term. 
Regarding narrative theory, some researchers consider the narrative to be an instrumental 
cognitive ability or a linguistic instrument, while others consider it an ontological category related to 
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how people are in the world, (Meretoja 2014, 89) or understand human life itself as having a narrative 
character. (MacIntyre 2007, 114) Another theoretical division regarding the role of narrative exists 
between an empirical tradition denouncing narration as a fundamental philosophical concept (G. 
Strawson 2004) and a hermeneutic tradition rejecting the idea of immediate experience of narratives 
and argues that all representations of the world human subjects are mediated by human linguistic 
interpretation, (Taylor 1971, 4) that subjectivity is always mediated by language, signs, symbols and 
texts. (Meretoja 2014, 96) 
David Kaplan suggests that Ricœur's hermeneutic method, as well as the analysis of the 
hermeneutic circle between human experience and narration, may enrich the analysis of context by 
including notions of linguistic and social mediation. (Kaplan 2006, 43–44) 
The reference is generally interpreted as a relation between language and reality, but W.V.O. 
Quine argues (Quine 1960) that it is inherently indeterminate or "inscrutable", that is to say, we cannot 
determine what this means. 
One problem discussed by Peter Unger (Unger 1980) and Geach (Geach 1962) is that for 
many physical objects there are several candidates to be the referent of a singular referential term. 
Without a way to select one of these we can ask to what extent they can be referenced. 
Donald Davidson is even more radical. (Davidson 1977) He argues that ref erence is a 
theoretically irrational notion, useless in a semantic theory or a theory of strict and literal meaning. His 
argument is that no substantial reference explanation is possible. 
Also, the deflationist theories of reference claim that there is nothing more in the concept of 
reference than what is captured by the instances of a scheme such as: 'a' refers to a. (Field 2001) 
But, with all the problems highlighted, the nature of the relationship between language and 
reality continues to be one of the most thoroughly discussed and debated in the philosophy of 
language. 
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